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Context: the border control crisis in 2011
Presumably the biggest crisis the Schengen members have gone 
through came in 2011, when Italy granted a temporary residence 
permit to Tunisian migrants that allowed them to travel into other 
Member States of the Schengen Area. France reacted promptly by 
reinstating border controls. Technically, both France and Italy acted 
in compliance with the EU acquis. Nevertheless, the European Com-
mission and European Parliament (EP) considered the behaviour of 
both countries to be in strict conflict with the spirit of Schengen 
and with the expected level of solidarity between its Member States.
On 26 April 2011, the then French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, and 
Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, sent a letter to the President 
of the European Commission and to the President of the European 
Council. Both leaders demanded that the blurry rules indicating 
when controls at internal borders can be reinstated had to be clari-
fied. The concern of the letter sent to the Commission was primarily 
better management of external borders, the fight against irregular 
migration, reinforcement of Frontex, the readmission policy and a 
requirement for a common European asylum system by the end of 
2012. The letter  also dealt with the internal dimension of Schen-
gen cooperation. Namely, it demanded specific solidarity mecha-
nisms “examining the possibility of temporarily restoring internal 
border controls in the event of exceptional difficulties in managing 
the common external borders“ (Sarkozy-Berlusconi, 2011). It also 
called for a more structured political oversight of the Schengen Area 
by the Commission.
This Policy Brief reflects on the Schengen Governance Package as a 
reaction to the incident at the French-Italian border and assesses its 
possible impact in resolving future disputes. It argues that the pack-
age will not help to solve the problems of the Schengen Area since it 
only targets border controls whereas solidarity and burden-sharing 
should also be in focus.
The Schengen Reform Package
In September 2011, the Commission presented its first communica-
tion called ´Schengen Governance – strengthening the area without 
internal border control´ which covered both an evaluation mecha-
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nism and the rules for reintroducing internal border controls1. 
The proposal highlighted a stronger ´Union-led approach´ and 
called for a significant strengthening of the role of the Commis-
sion. It was meant to be responsible for implementation and su-
pervision of the new rules as well as for defining measures which 
should be taken by the states that do not fulfil the Schengen ac-
quis. Furthermore, the reintroduction of internal border controls 
had to be approved by the Commission2. 
The Schengen Area of free movement is considered to be one of the most 
substantial and, in the eyes of many, most 
successful achievements of European 
integration. In 2014, the ‘Schengen 
Governance Package’, which alters the rules 
of the Schengen co-operation, came into force. 
It is a response to conflict among Member 
States in maintaining the common zone of 
freedom of movement. This Policy Brief aims 
to analyse how this package was developed 
and to assess whether it represents a suitable 
response to the conflict and difficulties 
within the Schengen agreement. The Brief 
argues that the Governance Package only 
touches on one part of the problem, namely 
border controls, whereas it does not deal 
with solidarity and burden-sharing and hence 
represents another missed opportunity to 
improve cooperation in the Schengen Area.
Issue 2015/1 • February 2015
This communication, and especially the proposed shift of com-
petencies to the Commisson, was met with extensive opposi-
tion from Member States. They perceived it as a threat to their 
authority over border control. Dissatisfaction was expressed 
particularly by Germany, France and Spain, with other Member 
States (the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria) also raising ob-
jections against the approach. Although Commissioner Cecilia 
Malmström reassured Member States that the powers of national 
governments would not be curtailed, national parliaments ar-
gued that the proposal was in breach of the principle of subsidi-
arity (Carrera, 2012; BPB, 2011).
The Commission prepared a compromise proposal where the di-
vision of power between the Commission and the Member States 
shifted in favour of the states. This version was presented and 
accepted at the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council in June 
2012. This time, the EP felt excluded from the whole procedure 
since the decision to accept the Schengen amendments was tak-
en unilaterally by the Council. The Parliament even threatened to 
complain before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and stopped 
debating legislative acts in five main JHA areas. This EP reac-
tion was unprecedented. Thus, further changes were made in 
order to balance the division of responsibilities and the Parlia-
ment achieved the right to be informed about the functioning 
of Schengen cooperation, e.g. about the reimposition of inter-
nal border controls (EurActiv, 2012)3. Two years after the border 
dispute, the package was formally adopted by the Parliament 
in June4 and by the JHA Council in October 2013. It was offi-
cially published and entered into force in November 2013 with a 
one-year transitional period for implementation by the Member 
States5. 
The main changes to the governance of the Schengen Area are 
that the Commission and the Member States will be jointly re-
sponsible for the evaluation and monitoring mechanism. Up to 
now, the Commission was a mere observer. The Commission 
will also be responsible for multi-annual and annual evaluation 
mechanisms, which means that it can employ both announced 
and unannounced on-site visits (previously only announced visits 
were possible). Ensuing reports must be submitted to the Coun-
cil and the Parliament. If a problem regarding border controls 
in a Member State is identified, an action plan to improve the 
situation is required. It will be the Commission that monitors 
and reports on the development until the shortcomings in bor-
der control practices are resolved. Up to now, the rules will apply 
to all Member States of the Schengen Area and must also be met 
by the states aiming to join Schengen in the future.
Regarding the reintroduction of border controls, states continue 
to be able to unilaterally reintroduce internal border controls. 
However, this is only in exceptional situations where there is a 
serious threat to public policy or internal security. Three situa-
tions can occur that legitimise the reintroduction of border con-
trols:
1) In case of a foreseeable event (e.g. major political or sporting 
events), the Member State must inform other States and the 
Commission in advance and submit all relevant information 
including the reasons for the reintroduction. The reintroduc-
tion of border controls can last for thirty days and can be pro-
longed by another thirty days up to a maximum of 6 months 
(this limit did not exist before).
2) In case of an unforeseeable event (e.g. natural disasters or 
terrorist attacks), the controls can be implemented immedi-
ately for a maximum period of 10 days with the possibility to 
prolong this period by another twenty days up to 2 months 
(in this case, monitoring at the EU level is required). It is ex-
plicitly stated that migration flows per se and crossings of 
the external borders in general cannot be used as a reason 
to reimpose border controls.
3) A completely new provision applies when a Member State is 
not able to control the Schengen Area´s external borders. 
Based on an evaluation report, the Commission can recom-
mend to take specific actions, e.g. to employ the European 
Border Guard Teams. Further, if a state does not fulfil its 
obligations and hereby endangers the whole Schengen Area, 
the Commission can recommend that the Council proposes 
controls along the internal borders6.  This can only happen 
as a last resort in exceptional circumstances when security 
or public order are under serious threat. The controls can 
last up to 6 months with the possibility of prolonging this 
period three times (Council of the European Union, 2013b; 
European Parliament, 2013).
To sum up, the main amendments to the evaluation mechanism, 
which was created in 1998 on an intergovernmental basis, con-
sist of a strengthened role for the Commission. It used to be a 
mere observer yet now it will act actively and jointly with the 
Member States. Regarding the reintroduction of internal border 
controls, more detailed rules are determined. The reimposition 
is only possible “as a last resort” after considering both inter-
nal security and freedom of movement. Whereas, according to 
the original Schengen Borders Code from 2006, it was neces-
sary only to inform other states about the reintroduction, states 
must now submit “all relevant data” and the Commission may 
request additional information. The reintroduction may now be 
discussed at “joint meetings” between concerned Member States 
and not only through informal consultations, as was once the 
case. Furthermore, the Commission and the Member States may 
appeal to the ECJ if the reintroduction is considered to be unjus-
tified. Finally, additional time limits are set and the right of the 
Parliament to be informed is highlighted (Peers, 2013).
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The Schengen Governance Package was adopted after two years 
of politically tense negotiations. Although the proposal to change 
the Schengen rules came from the states, it was the Commission 
that gained more power, particularly in the area of monitoring 
mechanisms. This is a clear signal that there is a demand for a 
neutral body of supervision over the Schengen Area and for more 
detailed rules.
Nevertheless, opinions differ on how fundamental this change is. 
Pascouau (2013) argues that it is an unequivocal shift towards 
an EU-led approach and a victory for the Commission. Zaiotti 
(2013), on the other hand, is convinced that the whole pack-
age only offers symbolic and vague changes and that the states 
will continue to be able to act discretionally. Peers (2013) stands 
somewhere in between by stating that the package is a compro-
mise that does not shift power to the Commission significantly 
and its impact will be very limited.
In general, this Policy Brief aligns with Peers in that even though 
the package defines the reimposition of internal borders in more 
detail, and thus makes their reintroduction more difficult7,  the 
interpretation of exceptional circumstances and last resort is 
broad. There remain many exceptions to time limits and the rec-
ommendations and reports from the Commission are in principle 
non-binding on Member States. All in all, the room for discretion 
remains extensive.
Furthermore, the package aims merely at border controls but 
this will not help solve situations such as that witnessed with 
Tunisian refugees. The problem Italy and other states at the 
external border deal with refers more to solidarity and burden-
sharing between Member States. Although it was only France 
that eventually reimposed border controls, other countries – Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria – expressed con-
cerns about the refugees, which illustrates that solidarity inside 
Schengen is problematic. There is no willingness to assist the 
states at the external border with incoming asylum seekers. In 
fact, resettlements and burden-sharing only function on a volun-
tary and ad hoc basis. Although solidarity and mutual respon-
sibility are mentioned in some non-binding documents such as 
the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum or the Stockholm 
Program, there is a clear need for systematisation in a legally 
binding document.
It was easier to agree on technical details concerning border 
controls rather than on a substantial change such as burden-
sharing. However, the latter needs to be addressed if Schengen 
cooperation is to continue as a European success story. In 2013, 
a renewed version of the Dublin regulation (Dublin III) entered 
into force but it also failed to address burden-sharing and soli-
darity. The relation between Dublin and Schengen rules is crucial 
and must be dealt with. One question arises immediately: how? 
One possibility is to determine EU quotas for the resettlement 
of asylum seekers e.g. according to Member States’ GDP and/
or size of population8. The ad hoc resettlements that have tak-
en place up to now are clearly not sufficient. A systematic and 
institutionalised system of quotas would help to relieve states 
along the external borders from their increased responsibility, 
while taking into account the capabilities of individual states. 
Of course, the quotas should not be random and would have to 
take into account various criteria, e.g. the principle of family re-
unification, which should be the first criterion, when considering 
which country is responsible for the asylum seeker.
Another proposal for better management of burden-sharing 
would be the right of asylum seekers to freely choose the coun-
try to seek asylum. As J. A. Linxweiler (2014) demonstrates, this 
does not necessarily contradict the Dublin system. According to 
the author of this paper, it would presuppose that the asylum 
systems and life standards in all EU countries are harmonised. 
Furthermore, the rule that an asylum seeker can only apply for 
asylum once within the EU must be preserved so that multiple 
applications – the so-called refugee in orbit –, and further over-
loading of asylum systems in Member States, is prevented. Since 
it can be assumed that asylum seekers would prefer to stay in a 
country where they have relatives, this system would probably 
also help to solve the problem of family reunification of refu-
gees.
Apparently, these suggestions are not without drawbacks and 
would most likely be perceived as too radical by Member States9. 
But even though they may be unattainable at present, it is impor-
tant to discuss them, since it is not sufficient to focus only on the 
security dimension of the Schengen cooperation. Protecting their 
own borders will not help to relieve the most overloaded states.
To sum up, one must appreciate the aim of the Schengen Gov-
ernance Package to clarify rules so that the reimposition of bor-
der controls is not overused or abused. On the other hand, it 
does not deal with the key problem that Schengen Members 
must face, namely solidarity and burden-sharing. In this sense, 
the package represents another missed opportunity to improve 
the functioning of Schengen cooperation.
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Footnotes
1The communication was presented along with two legislative proposals: Proposal for 
a regulation of the Council on the establishment of an evaluation mechanism to 
verify the application of the Schengen acquis and Proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in 
order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border con-
trol at internal borders in exceptional circumstances.
2If the Commission would be against the reintroduction of internal border controls 
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they could not be implemented.
3For a comparison of the two drafts see European Parliament (2012a) and European 
Parliament (2012b).
 4Not all parties agreed with the amendments to the Schengen acquis, e.g. The Greens 
claimed the regulations meant weakening of Schengen which the party could not 
support (Spiegel, 2013).
5The package consisted of two regulations: Regulation (EU) No 1051/2013 of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduc-
tion of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances and Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and 
monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repeal-
ing the Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a 
Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen (Council of 
the European Union, 2013a; Council of the European Union, 2013b).
6Also the States themselves can ask the Commission to propose this measure to the 
Council.
 7On the other hand, a new possibility to reimpose border controls is adde`d in case a 
state does not fulfil its duties.
8A similar principle is applied in Germany among the Bundesländer.
9Member States are not even able to agree on quotas referring only to Syrian refugees.
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